Research Papers

The Sub-Par Soviet Espionage of the Cold War

What comes to mind when you think of spies? Action heroes like James Bond or Jason Bourne? Unlike these fictional, gunslinging, muscle-car-driving, girl-getting spies that captivated audiences in theaters, real spies have had a perverse effect on history. Perhaps the most significant era of espionage occurred during the Cold War. By the end of World War II in 1945, American-Soviet relations were at an all-time low—distrust sparked paranoia, which escalated into excessive defensiveness. The capitalist Americans were the immoral enemies of the communist Soviets, and vice versa. Conflicting viewpoints between the two superpowers divided the world—either you agreed with the good guys or were a bad guy. The rising East-West tensions unofficially marked the start of the Cold War, a 45-year-long (1946-1991) political and idealistic standoff between the Americans and the Soviets. The Cold War produced some of the most iconic moments from the twentieth century: President Ronald Reagan’s address at the Berlin Wall; the Space Race; the Cuban Missile Crisis; and the Berlin Airlift. The Cold War also caused massive global conflicts, such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Each of these massive events were shaped by espionage. Spying influenced everything—from preventing all-out nuclear war to collapsing nations. The Americans and the Soviets were incredibly invested in Cold War-era espionage—they aimed to obtain anything that would provide them with a tactical advantage over the other.  During the Cold War, Soviet espionage was vastly ineffective due to negligent, substandard leadership, recurrent inaccuracies in reporting, and widespread paranoia and fear.

Although they had the technical advantage over the Americans, Soviet intelligence was destined for failure from the beginning. To understand the inefficiency of Soviet Cold War espionage, one must first evaluate the Soviet intelligence agencies of the time. Modern neurologists have analyzed Premier Joseph Stalin’s personality as incredibly paranoid, control-needing, stubborn, and power-hungry.  From the 1920s and 30s, up through the Second World War, Stalin grew wary of his Anglo-American allies and sensed tensions growing between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the West. Stalin worked tirelessly to install undercover agents high up in the British and American governments in response to his growing paranoia. These “moles” would become valuable to Stalin in the early 1950s, when he merged the military intelligence and the foreign intelligence service, thus creating the “small” Committee of Intelligence (KI), which would become the Committee for State Security (KGB) in 1954. As the Soviet equivalent to the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Stalin created the KI as a more streamlined, centralized intelligence agency tasked with the majority of the duties surrounding Soviet intelligence. Stalin’s severe paranoia sparked his desire to eliminate what he called, “estimated intelligence”, or unverifiable, unreliable information, and thus, the agency was tasked with filtering such information out.  The “small” KI was Stalin’s Spying Frankenstein, an experimental organization that he brought to life, which revealed Stalin’s habit to transform multivoiced, contradictory data into a more concise, hardline picture. Although set upon a direct pathway to success, the KI would eventually succumb to the very thing it sought to eliminate from the Soviet intelligence collection system: a surplus of information, a large amount of which was “estimated”. The “small” KI would become revitalized in the form of the KGB after the agency was buried in an avalanche of intelligence around the time of Stalin’s death. Stalin’s paranoia drove him to create intelligence agencies, but paranoia also prevented him and his successors from utilizing their intelligence effectively.

Soviet espionage was limited by its leadership, which led to many tactical errors and embarrassments. As a stubborn and paranoid leader, Joseph Stalin was reluctant to accept information obtained from his intelligence agencies. Stalin’s poor leadership of his intelligence agencies and disregard of their reports were common throughout his time in power. For example, he was informed well in advance of the German invasion of the Western USSR in 1941, codenamed Operation Barbarossa, both by his intelligence agencies and by his allies—the British and the Americans. Stalin’s disregard of intelligence surrounding Barbarossa resulted in over fourteen million Soviet casualties. Further, prior to the Cold War, poor leadership escalated Western-Soviet tensions. In 1941, during the height of World War Two, Stalin spied heavily upon his allies and financial aids: the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Once they found out about Stalin’s spying, they were outraged, and as Author John Lewis Gaddis said, this “furthered the notion of Western statesmen that Soviets shouldn’t be trusted.” According to a Soviet intelligence veteran, “The most difficult task of intelligence is not to obtain information, but to get its findings and conclusions across to the leadership,…[especially] ones that contradict…deep-seated beliefs and perceptions.” Strangely, Stalin’s blunders with Barbarossa and the West did not get across to him; in fact, the case was nearly the opposite, as towards the end of Stalin’s life, he rarely even read the KI’s reports, which were intended to help him make decisions.

Soviet leadership of intelligence agencies did not improve after Stalin’s death. Before his passing in 1953, Stalin “collectivized leadership” in Moscow, which was an attempt to prevent another one-leader style of government. Furthermore, the Cold War era is notorious for the distrust it created within governments. Officials were generally much more paranoid of the people around them, as they did not know who they could trust—anyone could be a spy. Between the commonality of paranoia and fear, and Stalin’s collectivized leadership, Stalin’s successors were more interested in their own political survival. In this way, Stalin passed his paranoia down to his successors, making political progression much more difficult for the Soviets. Like a newborn deer to a lion, the newly-created KI collapsed quickly, as its potential for usefulness was rapidly eradicated by Stalin’s paranoia, and his inadequate, negligent leadership. While Stalin’s leadership severely limited the KI’s potential, their reports also were commonly inaccurate.

The plague of inaccuracies in the KI’s reporting were the cause of many tactical blunders. With their sights set on Western Europe, the US, and the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO), the KI was set upon a direct path to successfully dominating American intelligence. Stalin’s work to obtain moles proved effective, as his efforts provided the Soviets with an ample number of loyal, trustworthy, and consistent sources of information who were able to relentlessly steal state secrets from the Western governments, primarily the US. According to a report from the American Intelligence Journal from 1977-1978, the US government knew that the Soviets were primarily focused on them and would go to great lengths to do so. “We, the United States, are the primary targets of the Soviet espionage effort…the CIA report estimates that Soviet defense programs…[would] cost $130 million…” Despite their advantages, the KI was not always correct in their reporting, and often, their reports worsened tensions between the US and the USSR. They reported that the US was trying to create coups in Egypt and nationalist uprisings in Germany. The Soviets even believed that the US would drop a nuke on Korea, and that despite their hopes for a peace agreement, the US was attempting to collapse the Soviet Peace agenda with propaganda. None of the three scenarios were confirmed or ever came to fruition, but they only worsened tensions and paranoia in Moscow. Additionally, the KI occasionally would intentionally report misinformation. Because of his quick-tempered unpredictability, KI officials tended to “lean on the safe side” in their analysis, so as not to upset Stalin. While Stalin was alive, intentionally or not, KI officials associated his fears and assumptions with Soviet foriegn policy, and how they were supposed to operate. The KI operated in a paranoia-like state because of Stalin’s paranoia-fueled testiness, and because they believed there was no way to rekindle Soviet-American relations in the near future. Evidently, the KI’s reporting, whether it was accurate or misinformation, spurred further Soviet paranoia, and ultimately pushed on the Cold War, when peace could’ve been made much earlier. Accentuated by constant paranoia, the combination of poor leadership and inaccurate intelligence would lead to one of the biggest intelligence blunders of the Cold War: the Berlin Airlift.

The extent of the Soviet Intelligence’s failure during the Cold War was apparent during the Berlin Airlift—an intelligence mistake that was easily foresee-able and avoidable. Following the end of World War II, the Allied forces divided both Germany and its capital, Berlin, into quadrants—one for each of the allies: the US, the UK, France, and the USSR. The Blockade lasted for nearly a year, between June of 1948 and May of 1949, as the Soviets cut off all transit between West Berlin (US, UK, France) and West Germany in an effort to force the West out of Berlin. In response to the Soviet’s Blockade of West Berlin, the West provided West Berlin support with supplies through a massive airlift. The Blockade was Stalin’s gamble for two objectives: to force Western forces out of Berlin without war and to delay the West from merging their zones, and notably, he failed to achieve both of these goals with the Blockade. This raises multiple questions surrounding the Soviets. How were the Soviets defeated in the first major international display between the East and the West? How could they not have seen the Airlift coming? The blame for the national embarrassment in Berlin is on Soviet intelligence agencies and their leaders. Before their defeat, Soviet intelligence forces blamed popular resistance to Sovietization in East Germany on West Berlin-based hostile forces, rather than stating the real reason—oppressive Soviet rule. In this way, the information the KI relayed to Moscow never depicted the whole truth, as they feared what would happen if they were truthful. Furthermore, Stalin and his subordinates, unwilling to accept reality, often disregarded the KI when delivered with accurate, well-cited, evidence-supported information. Most importantly, Soviet intelligence was simply incapable of successfully evaluating the airlift’s probability for success, and they failed to convey the importance of the Airlift plans to their leadership in the first place. The embarrassment that was the Airlift could have been easily prevented at multiple times, but Soviets at every level failed to do so. This series of repeated “miscommunications” caused the Blockade to fail, and placed shame on the Soviets on the international stage.

Intelligence played a crucial role in influencing the events and outcome of the Cold War. Soviet espionage during the Cold War was predominantly ineffective. Inadequate leadership, erroneous information, and the commonality of paranoia, amongst leaders and spies alike, were the root causes of failure for Soviet intelligence. An event like the Berlin Airlift is a superb display of faulty Soviet espionage, as it was an enormous embarrassment for the USSR as a whole. Had Soviet espionage been more efficient and effective, the Cold War would likely have played out much differently than how history truly did. Such thoughts almost make one wonder: How different would the modern-day be if Soviet espionage was successful?

 

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